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Abstract
Based on the Cobb-Douglas preferences and standard (S,s) model this study extends
the previous theoretical frameworks by deriving explicitly the optimal consumption
rule for durables. The model states that an agent has a desire to keep a fraction of his
wealth to be invested in a durable. Because of the depreciation of the durable together
with stochastic movements in prices and agent’s wealth, the actual fraction deviates
from that of the target. Including the possibility of uncertainty, the model shows that
it is optimal for the agent to allow an inaction (S,s) band around the target level of
durable to avoid irreversible investment costs, and not to adjust until the critical band
trigger is reached. The implications of the model - the width of the inaction (S,s) band
is positively related to an increase in uncertainty, while a higher depreciation rate
leads to more frequent adjustment - were tested using four Household Budget Surveys
from Finland. The results on automobile purchases did not reject the (S,s) model.
Higher income uncertainty widens the inaction band and decreases the probability of
adjustment, while an increase in repair costs increases the probability of adjustment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known fact that uncertainty about future consumption possibilities
determines also today’s saving and consumption purchases. This has a direct link
to business cycles. An increase in uncertainty contributes a fall in consumption
and may lead the economy to a depression. In literature, large empirical and
theoretical work has been carried out to understand the link between uncertainty
and consumption. Especially two mechanisms have been found to be important
in determining this link. The first one, originally introduced by Leland (1968),
is known as a precautionary saving motive. An increase in uncertainty creates
an incentive for an agent to increase the precautionary savings and, in Deaton’s
(1991) terminology, to exhibit buffer-stocks for a rainy day. This reduces today’s
consumption purchases.
The second mechanism which affects the timing of consumption purchases is the
irreversibility mechanism which - besides on uncertainty - builds on the existence
of transaction costs for durables. Typically, these costs should be paid every time
when durables are purchased or sold, including searching and information cost
(lemons problem), sales taxes and commissions to brokers, among others.1 While
the investments are often at least partially irreversible, it can sometimes be better
to postpone the purchases until the consumer obtains more information about
the future. As McDonald & Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1991) and Dixit & Pindyck
(1994) have shown, uncertainty over income, asset and commodity prices, costs
and other market conditions create an option value of waiting for new information
to arise before adjusting consumption to the desired level. Therefore, there is
often an incentive to delay the purchase/selling decisions to the future until new
information arrives.2
At the individual level, uncertainty over future consumption possibilities may be
divided into idiosyncratic and systematic risk. The first means a possibility that
a consumer faces an unexpected shock in his nominal wealth due to, for example,
accident or illness. The second means that he is conscious of the uncertainty
which has an influence on the whole economy, and which may affect his wages and
wealth position. An adverse supply shock which affects prices is a good example.
As one or both of the uncertainty components increase, consumers postpone
their decision-making more easily to the future and the stronger is the incentive
to wait for new information. Clearly, if this increase in uncertainty affects many
agents at the same time, the theory provides a link between individual purchases,
aggregate consumption and business cycles.
1Bernanke (1985) included the consumer’s distaste for shopping and learning how to use new durables.
Lam (1989) argued that there exist no perfect resale market for durables which creates additional costs for
consumers.
2High technology such as mobile phones and computers provide other examples. Typically, the newest
versions of those goods provide features that the older ones do not. Thus, there is always a temptation to
postpone purchases until the latest version arrives, which carries an option value to wait.
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Recent consumption research has considered irreversible investment, transaction
costs and uncertainty to be crucial reasons in explaining individual investments in
durables. Pindyck (1991) and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) have argued that the level
of risk may be even more important than taxes and interest rates for investment
decisions. The irreversible investment decision under uncertainty can be featured
by the (S,s) model. According to this model, the durable is adjusted to a target
level when the state variable crosses the critical lower or upper band trigger.
When the state variable is inside the inaction band, the optimal policy is not to
adjust the durable. The attractiviness of the (S,s) model is in its implications such
as, in most of the times, consumers do not adjust their stock of the durables, and
when they do, the adjustments are substantial and lumpy. However, the former
(S,s) models (see e.g. Grossman & Laroque (1990) and Lam (1991)) explaining
the effect of uncertainty suffer from the fact that risk is typically defined as
a constant parameter. In the series of papers, Hassler (1994, 1996a,b,c) has
combined the preliminary work of option value of waiting by McDonald & Siegel
(1986) and the standard (S,s) model of inventory. His contribution to the model
is that the risk level is in itself a stationary stochastic process over time. An
increase in risk increases the value of waiting and the purchases are more easily
postponed to the future. The shorter the high-risk periods are expected to be,
the stronger is the incentive to wait for new information.
This paper concentrates on the irreversibility mechanism.3 The theoretical model
extends the framework of Hassler (1994, 1996a) by deriving the intertemporal
consumption rule explicitly. The foundation of the model comes from the fa-
mous optimisation results of the static Cobb-Douglas preferences which state
that the optimum is a function of (relative) commodity prices, wealth and the
(constant) parameter reflecting a fraction of total wealth spent on the good. This
result is extended to the dynamic context so that a consumer has a desire to keep
a fraction of his wealth close to a constant target value. Since the durable depre-
ciates over time together with the stochastic movements in prices and consumer’s
wealth, the actual level of the fraction deviates from that of desired. While the
transaction costs prevent an agent to adjust the stock of a durable continuously,
the adjustment is not made until a critical lower (or upper) bound is reached.
The model includes uncertainty over the future consumption possibilities by as-
suming that an agent faces the two types of risk as discussed above. First, he
faces idiosyncratic risk. To model this, we follow Hassler (1994) and use standard
Poisson process for unexpected jumps in prices and consumer’s real wealth and
show how a change in the expected time until the jump occurs will have an effect
on the durable purchases. Second, he faces systematic risk which is defined as a
switch between two states of the economy, namely, low and high risk state. The
model shows how an increase in systematic risk will cause the inaction range to
increase. Then, the purchases are postponed until the critical bounds are reached
or there is a switch back to the low risk state.
3For the importance of precautionary saving motive and its empirical relevance, see Caballero (1990),
Hubbard et al. (1995) and Carroll & Samwick (1996, 1998) and the referenced cited there.
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The theoretical model implicates that an increase in uncertainty and adjustment
costs should have a positive effect on the width of the (S,s) inaction bands while
a greater depreciation should lead to more frequent adjustment. The validity of
implications of the model is then tested using three distinct methods and data
on automobile purchases from four cross-sectional Finnish Household Budget
Surveys conducted by Statistics Finland. First, the width of the inaction (S,s)
band is tested against the household-level uncertainty which is measured by the
difference between the actual and predicted disposable income of the household,
housing debt and expenditures on health. The repair costs are included to test the
effect of depreciation rate on automobile purchases. The second method builds on
the multiplicative heteroskedasticity approach to test a household-level variance
of income. The third method is based on heteroskedastic probit analysis in order
to identify the effect of the variables above on the probability of transaction.
This study is organised as follows. Section two illustrates the basic (S,s) rule and
the augmented (S,s) model in which the uncertainty is included and divided into
the components discussed above. Section three describes the data used in the
study. In section four, we report the main results, evaluate them with respect
to the international evidence, and discuss the problems concerning the model’s
goodness-of-fit and the measurement of household-level uncertainty. Finally, sec-
tion five concludes the paper.
2. (S,s) MODEL
In this section we introduce the theoretical (S,s) model used in the study. First,
in section 2.1 we introduce the standard (S,s) rule in order to get an intuition of
discontinuous investment decisions. Then, section 2.2 reviews the irreversibility
literature. In section 2.3 we include individual and systematic risk in the model
and show how an increase in one of the risk components will affect the timing of
the durable purchase.
2.1. Introduction to (S,s) Rule
Individual investment decisions together with transaction costs can be described
by using a (S,s) model originally introduced by Arrow et al. (1951) for the study
of inventories. According to the model, the state variable evolves stochastically
over time and is allowed to deviate from the optimal target which can be in-
terpreted as a frictionless target. The more it deviates, the more disutility the
consumer obtains, and the temptation to readjust it back to the target level in-
creases. However, every time when this readjustment is made, the consumer has
to pay a lump sum adjustment cost which prevents him from updating continu-
ously. Under uncertainty, consumer is unaware of his future wealth, prices and
other market conditions. Thus, by postponing purchase decision to the future
and waiting for new information to arrive, he can possibly make a better deal.
This creates an option value of waiting. The state variable continues to deviate
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Figure 2.1: Standard (S,s) Model.
from the target until the lower/upper threshold/trigger is reached. Then it is
readjusted back to the optimal level. The triggers can be seen as limits in which
the temptation to adjust (utility gain) equals the adjustment costs plus the value
of waiting. Inside the band the costs are higher than the utility gain from the
updating, and no adjustment is made. Clearly, there is always a trade-off be-
tween adjusting now or waiting for new information before making the purchase
decision.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the optimal (S,s) rule. For convenience, let us consider
that the state variable is a stock of durable which depreciates over time.4 Also,
assume that the consumption flow is proportional to the stock of the good. The
vertical axis represents the deviation of the current stock from some target level
a∗. This frictionless target would be chosen if no transaction costs existed, that
is, the stock of a durable would be continuously updated. However, continuous
adjustment would entail infinite transaction costs and, therefore, cannot be op-
timal. After the purchase at the time t0, the state variable is most of the time
inside the inaction band (S,s) and the readjustment is not made until it reaches
one of the triggers S or s. When a falls below some lower bound s, consumer
pays a lumpy adjustment cost and the stock is readjusted back to a target size
a∗. In figure 2.1, this readjustment is not made until at time t1. Similarly, when
the state variable increases above the upper trigger S, it is readjusted back to
the target level a∗. This happens at time t2. As long as the stock of the durable
good remains inside the band, no action takes place.
4In this illustrative example, the stock of a durable can also be interpreted as a control variable.
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Often, it is unrealistic to define the state variable only as a stock of durable
which depreciates over time. Instead, consumer’s wealth can be seen as one of
the important variables determining the level of the stock. Typically, consumer’s
wealth grows over time and reflects the changes in consumer’s spending. Even
though the amount of the stock itself can remain unchanged, the quality of this
stock may depend on the wealth level. Also, the relative prices of durables
and nondurables are important determinants for consumption.5 On the other
hand, the optimal target level may depend on the quality and relative prices of
goods, consumer’s wealth, seasonal dummies and various demographic factors6,
while the size of the (S,s) band can be related, among others, to the size of
the transaction cost, changes in household size, depreciation rate and to factors
affecting the opportunity cost of deviating from the optimal level of durables. The
use and decay characteristics of capital goods also differ because of the intensity
of use, or the different extraction rates once the good has been purchased and
installed.
Unfortunately, the theoretical model which covers all those notions is technically
complex. Therefore, the construction of the model must include compromises
which are often unrealistic but necessary for analytical or numerical solutions.
First, the stochastic process of the state variable must be characterised. Second,
the target level and the trigger points have to be characterised. Third, one
have to characterise how an increase in uncertainty will effect on the timing of
the purchases. Finally, one has to characterise the source of uncertainty. This
motivates the theoretical model in the section 2.3.
2.2. Review of Irreversibility Literature
Recently, irreversibility and uncertainty over future have been considered impor-
tant factors in determining the timing of the durable purchases. Even though the
link between uncertainty and consumption has been understood for a long time,
the theoretical models concentrating on uncertainty, irreversibility mechanism
and consumption did not appear until the mid-1980s.7 In our opinion, there are
three main reasons for this appearance. First, the dynamic nature of durable
consumption seemed much more complex than that of the other components of
consumption, and the former consumption models, including the standard per-
manent income hypothesis, were uncapable on explaining the large variations in
consumption over the business cycles, especially for durables purchases.8 Second,
5In literature, the state variable has been modelled as the ratio of the consumption good to wealth
(Grossman & Laroque (1990) and Eberly (1994)), the ratio of the durable stock to nondurables (Attanasio
(1995, 2000)) and the ratio of the durable to permanent income (Dunn (1998)), among others.
6In addition, the target level does not necessarily coincide with the optimal frictionless level without
transaction costs. For such models, see Attanasio (1995, 2000) and Hassler (1996a).
7This review concentrates only on literature concerning uncertainty, irreversibility and consumption.
See Hassler (1996c) for a general discussion of the connection between risk and consumption. Carruth et
al. (2000) and the references cited there give a thorough survey on the literature of industrial investment
decisions under uncertainty.
8Typically, new models appeared because the old ones were not able to describe the U.S. economy.
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the irreversibility models were developed to test if the results from the successors
of Hall (1978), such as Mankiw (1982), hold also under liquidity constraints and
other market incompletenesses.9 Finally, the framework of McDonald & Siegel
(1986), Pindyck (1991) and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) enabled us to understand bet-
ter the significant effect which uncertainty and expectations have on irreversible
investment decisions. Instead of using these categories in the following, we, how-
ever, used the classification between microeconomic and aggregate level studies.
The following survey by no means covers the whole literature. Rather, our pur-
pose is to show the importance of the irreversibility mechanism and the role of
uncertainty on the timing of consumption decision and to sketch the evolution
of irreversibility theory.
Typically, the literature involving aggregation first studied convex (quadratic)
costs of adjustment. For example, Bernanke (1985) were among the first ones to
include adjustment costs in a partial-adjustment model to study the separabil-
ity in utility between durables and nondurables and the persistence of aggregate
durables expenditures. He concluded that the quadratic adjustment costs are not
sufficient in explaining the excess sensitivity to transitory income in the aggregate
time-series. Subsequently, many other studies based on the convex adjustment
costs turned out to be unsuccesfull. The main reason for this poor performance is
that the convex costs approach predict a smooth adjustment towards an equilib-
rium. Also, to avoid increasing costs, agents will adjust their stocks infrequently
and by small amounts. This, of course, contradicts common observations that
durables are typically purchased in lumpy increments and updated only infre-
quently.10
A direction of improvement was then to consider nonconvex costs of adjustment
(or “kinked” adjustment costs as described by Bertola & Caballero (1990)), such
as fixed or proportional costs. The model by Bar-Ilan & Blinder (1987, 1992)
can be seen as a preliminary work towards inertial models of consumer expendi-
tures and an extension of the standard LC/PIH framework to include consumer
durables. In their model it was sometimes optimal for the agents “to do nothing”
if the transactions involve lumpy costs and to choose a finite range rather than
a single level for their durables. The study of Grossman & Laroque (1990) was
also based on the idea of nonconvex costs. Their theoretical model extended an
inventory model of Arrow et al. (1951) to study the portfolio choice and a single
illiquid durable purchase. It was proved that the optimal strategy can be modeled
as an (S,s) rule as in Figure 2.1 above. The attractiviness of this approach was
that it supports the common observations, that is, in most periods consumers
do not adjust their stock of durables and when they finally do, the adjustments
9Mankiw (1982) showed that under the rational expectations augmented permanent income hypothesis,
consumer durables expenditures should follow an ARMA(1,1) process. However, this implication was strongly
rejected by the aggregate data (see e.g. Attanasio (1998)) and new models were needed to understand why
it did not work.
10See also Bar-Ilan & Blinder (1992).
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are usually substantial and lumpy. A closely related approach to this was em-
ployed by Lam (1989) who used irreversibility mechanism and imperfect resale
market approach, and showed that these cause substantial serial correlation on
aggregate durable expenditures.11 His interpretation was that when resales are
costly, consumers are reluctant to adjust their stocks downward, and, because
of the possibility of having to resell, hesitant in adjusting their stocks upward.
Thus, consumers tolerate their actual stocks to deviate from their desired target
levels over the business cycles.
As noted above, one purpose of the adaption of the micro-level models together
with the assumption of incomplete markets was that they helped to understand
why the time-series of aggregate expenditures behave unlike the prevailing the-
ories (such as Mankiw (1982)) predicted. Based on the individual behaviour
several studies have concentrated on the aggregate effects and the business-cycle
dynamics. In his slow adjustment models Caballero (1990, 1993) showed how
the lumpy purchases in microeconomic level can explain different features of the
aggregate time-series behaviour of durable goods, and how shocks can have per-
sistent effects when individuals follow (S,s) policies. Caballero & Engel (1993)
used a model in which the probability that an agent adjusts his durable stock is
increasing to the deviation of the state variable from its moving target. Leahy
& Zeira (2000) used shocks in individual wealth and decline in productivity to
show that the timing decision can serve as a mechanism for the amplification
and propagation of aggregate shocks. A decline in wealth causes individuals to
rebuild their wealth position and during this time they delay durable purchases,
which reduces the total demand dramatically for some time.
Even though a common feature of all these studies is that they showed clearly
the important connection between uncertainty, individual purchases and business
cycles, the weakness of the theoretical presentation is that risk was typically
defined as a constant parameter. To overcome this issue Hassler (1994, 1996a,b,c)
presented a model where the risk level is in itself a stationary stochastic process
over time. Based on the preliminary work of option value of waiting by McDonald
& Siegel (1986) and the standard (S,s) model of inventory, he showed how an
increase in risk increases the value of waiting, and the purchases are more easily
postponed to the future. The shorter the high-risk periods are expected to be,
the stronger is the incentive to wait for new information. Hassler also showed
how an increase in uncertainty affects the dynamics of aggregate consumption.
One shortcoming of the theoretical (S,s) models based on the individual be-
haviour is that they are restrictive in assumptions and the characterisation of an
individual behaviour is possible only under very special circumstances.12 Also,
11See also House & Leahy (2000) who used adverse selection and lemons problem to study the effect of
resale market imperfections.
12Bar-Ilan & Blinder (1992) pointed out that even simple generalisations of the (S,s) models are extremely
difficult to analyse because one looses the possibility of having a single state variable.
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these models typically do not have a closed-form solutions and they must be
employed numerically. Nevertheless, several studies (see Lam (1989) and Carroll
& Dunn (1997), among others) use calibration and simulation tests to show that
the (S,s) models can explain the empirical data better than the previous theo-
retical models. To summarise, both theoretical and empirical studies based on
(S,s) model have shown the importance of uncertainty and irreversibility mech-
anism on the timing of individual consumption purchases and, thus, aggregate
dynamics of durables consumption.13
The following augmented (S,s) model introduces the effect of an increase in un-
certainty on the timing of durable purchases. While the foundation of the model
builds on the framework of Hassler (1994, 1996a), it derives the consumption rule
more explicitly by using Dixit & Pindyck’s (1994) methodology and by dynam-
icing the famous optimisation rule of the static Cobb-Douglas preferences.
2.3. Model
In a static context, the maximisation of the standard Cobb-Douglas preferences
subject to the linear budget constraint produces an optimal amount of the com-
modity. This optimum is a function of prices, consumer’s wealth and the constant
fraction of wealth spent on that good. Thus, the fraction of the wealth can be
expressed as
at(Pt, Ct,Wt) =
PtCt
Wt
, (2.1)
where Ct is the stock of durable, Pt is the (relative) price of the durable andWt is
consumer’s total wealth including income, real and financial assets. Consider an
agent who continuously faces the problem when to update his stock of a durable
in response to the stochastic movements of the variables on the right-hand side
of the equation (2.1). Assume that he wants to follow an optimal rule where the
stock of a durable is kept in a level where it costs a certain constant fraction of
his total wealth. Typically, durables are expensive and their purchases include
lumpy costs that are at least partially irreversible. This feature prevents him
from continuous updating. In the absence of adjustment costs, the consumer is
willing to update continuously his stock of a durable and keep a equal to the
frictionless target a∗.14 Together with the depreciation of the durable each of the
variables in the right-hand side in (2.1) evolves stochastically according to the
following geometric Brownian motions
dW = αWWdt+ δWWdzW , (2.2)
dP = αPPdt+ δPPdzP ,
13In section 4.3 we discuss more on the empirical microeconomic evidence of the (S,s) model.
14It could be more appropriate to model consumer’s behaviour such that a certain fraction of wealth is
spent on consumption categories. This includes transportation, electronics, clothes etc. rather than a single
commodity such as a car or a computer. However, the technical treatment, then, becomes more difficult.
See Estola & Hokkanen (1999) for a more detailed discussion on this subject.
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dC = −δCCdt.
Typically, both consumer’s wealth and the price of the durable are increasing over
time. Thus, the parameters αW and αP can be interpreted as drift components.
δW and δP are the standard deviations of the processes reflecting the uncertainty
over future. The terms dzk are the increments of the Brownian motion capturing
the idea that the variables satisfy the Markov property so that their next period
probability distributions are functions of their current stage only. Also, the
variance of the prediction error grows linearly with the time horizon.15 δC is the
rate of the depreciation. In Appendix A we show that the fraction of wealth a
evolves as well according to the geometric Brownian motion
da = αaadt+ δaadza. (2.3)
Infrequently, the consumer faces unexpected idiosyncratic shocks in his total
wealth such as unemployment or illness.16 Also, an accident can cause an imme-
diate depreciation of the commodity. We will use a Poisson process to capture
the idea of unexpected jumps in the ratio PC
W
. Letting λ denote the mean arrival
rate of an event, during a time interval of (infinitesimal) length dt, the probability
that a negative or positive shock will appear is given by λ
2
dt. Thus, PC
W
shifts an
amount ±ξ with equal probability. The probability that an event will not occur
is given by 1− λdt. The combined Poisson and Ito processes are given as
da = αaadt+ δaadza + adq (2.4)
in which
dq =



ξ with probability λ
2
dt
0 with probability 1− λdt
−ξ with probability λ
2
dt
. (2.5)
The increments dz and dq are assumed to be independent such that E [dzdq] = 0
and E [dzdz] = dt. The expected length of time until the shock appears is λ−1.
Correspondingly, the consumer faces the systematic risk concerning the economy
as a whole. The risk comes, for instance, from the threat of war, stock markets
or an adverse supply shock.17 Hereafter, risk is defined to be synonymous with
uncertainty regarding future events that are relevant for the agent’s decision-
making. Following Hassler (1994, 1996a, 2001) the systematic risk is defined
such that the consumer expects the state of the economy to switch stochastically
15Typically, in the long run the trend component is the dominant determinant of the Brownian motion,
whereas in the short run the volatility component of the process dominates. See Dixit (1993), Dixit &
Pindyck (1994) and Merton (1999) for an introduction and for mathematical properties of Brownian motion.
16Bernanke (1985) noted that at the family level, the most important influences on income are non-
systematic factors such as ability, education and inheritance, among others.
17Bonoma & Garcia (1997) included infrequent information arrivals such as periodic releases of macroe-
conomic statistics and divident announcements.
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between two levels.18 The state 0 is defined as a low risk state, while 1 is high
risk state. The state u is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process with a
transition matrix "
1− γ0 γ0
γ1 1− γ1
#
. (2.6)
At time t, if the economy is in state ut = 0, 1, it is assumed to switch to the state
ut with probability γu during the time dt. The probability that there does not
exist a switch is 1− γu. The expected length until the risk switches is γ−1u .
The augmented (S,s) model in figure 2.2 illustrates the evolution of the variable a
and the adjustment process. The vertical axis is defined as in figure 2.1. Assume
that S1 > S0 > a
∗ > s0 > s1. At time t0 the fraction of the wealth a is at
the frictionless optimum a∗. Typically, consumer’s real wealth is increasing over
time (the ratio P
W
is decreasing) while the depreciation decreases the stock of
the durable. This means that a decreases over time until the lower trigger s0 is
reached at time t1. Then the consumer pays the adjustment costs and the stock
is adjusted back to the optimal level a∗. Sometimes the opposite happens, so that
the real wealth is decreasing over time and the depreciation of the durable is not
high enough to force the variable a to decrease.19 At time t2 the upper trigger
S0 is hit and the stock of durable is adjusted back to the frictionless optimum.
20
Occasionally, a consumer faces unexpected changes in his real wealth (idiosyn-
cratic risk). For example, at time t3 he confronts a reduction in real wealth which
causes a upward jump on a variable a. However, this jump is not high enough for
an adjustment to be made. At time t4 a positive shock to real wealth occurs (for
instance, a win in a lottery or a bequest) and shifts the variable below the lower
trigger. This causes an upward adjustment of a durable back to the target level
a∗. For convenience, if the shock occurs, it is hereafter assumed large enough
to be optimal to adjust the variable immediately.21 This assumption together
with depreciation and positive growth of the real wealth imply that the variable
is nearly always in the region between the lower trigger and target level. Thus,
we will concentrate on the range [s1, a
∗] and we will not formulate the situation
such that between the times t1 and t2. At time t5 an uncertainty concerning the
systematic risk increases widening the inaction band to (S1, s1). Clearly, a con-
18The assumption of bivariate risk in economy is unrealistic but necessary for the technical treatment. To
allow more states results in the multivariate systems of differential equations which are difficult to solve.
19Technically, depending on the sign of the drift parameter αa, a is increasing or decreasing over time.
See equation (A.6) in Appendix A.
20Hassler (1994,1996a) assumed that there exist upper and lower targets a and a such that if the state
variable is hit by the upper trigger Su, then it is readjusted to the upper target au. Similarly, if the lower
bound su is reached then the variable is readjusted to the lower target au. For the technical treatment to
become easier we assume that au = au = a
∗.
21Of course, after the shock occurs the adjustment of a durable does not take place immediately. In-
stead, there is an “adjustment period” when, for instance, the consumer is collecting information about the
prices and properties of durables available in the market. Even though it is possible to build models with
deliberating time and jumps inside the bands without adjustment, they are difficult to treat technically.
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Figure 2.2: Augmented (S,s) Model.
sumer allows larger deviation from the target level before adjusting. The larger
the uncertainty, the wider is the inaction range and the larger is the deviation
between actual and target level.
The problem is to determine the critical points, triggers, at which it is optimal to
pay the adjustment costs and adjust the commodity back to the optimum level.
Since a evolves stochastically, we are not able to determine an explicit time when
the investment is to be made. Instead, the investment rule which follows will
take the form of a critical values (s1, s0) such that it is optimal to invest once
the variable a goes below one of these band triggers.
As shown above, an agent obtains disutility if the state variable deviates from
its frictionless optimum which is, for convenience, assumed to be a constant.22
Let xt = at − a∗ be the state variable denoting the gap between the actual and
the target level, and let the loss of deviation be a quadratic distance from the
target level.23 If the total costs are the sum of expected discounted values of
present- and future-period costs, then the optimisation problem for an infinitely
22This assumption is made to simplify the mathematical treatment of the model. However, the assumption
is in harmony with the standard Cobb-Douglas preferences where the fraction of the wealth is a constant
number. See Niemela¨inen (1995) for details and other preferences where this fraction can be shown to depend
on prices, wealth or both. See also Hassler (1996a) for a model which allows the target level to depend on
wealth and the state of the economy.
23The quadratic loss function approach means that a consumer’s disutility is symmetric around the target
level. While this assumption can be questionable, the technical reasons prevent us to use asymmetric
disutility approach.
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long-lived consumer can be written as
min
"
Et
Z ∞
t
e−rt
Ã
x2t
2
+ Itc
!
dt
#
, (2.6)
subject to the equations (2.4) and (2.5). Et denotes the expectation operator
conditional on the information set available to consumer at time t and r is the
subjective discount rate. For convenience, the consumption flow is assumed to
be proportional to the stock of the durable. It is a bivariate variable such that
It =
(
1, if a is adjusted
0 otherwise
. (2.7)
It denotes that an adjustment cost c should be paid only when the adjustment
is made. The optimal value function V (xt, ut) is defined as the minimum of
discounted expected total costs over the infinite future time horizon when the
economy is in state ut. In Appendix B we show that if the consumer is following
the optimal policy, the Bellman equation
V (xt, ut) =
x2t
2
dt+ e−rdtEtV (xt+dt, ut+dt) (2.8)
can be rewritten as
rV (xt, ut) =
x2t
2
+
·
αxxtV
0(xt, ut) +
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, ut)
¸
(2.9)
+λ [(V (a∗, ut) + c)− V (xt, ut)] + γu [V (xt, ut)− V (xt, ut)] .
The left-hand side is the value of the cost function multiplied by the discount
rate. The first term on the right-hand side is the utility loss during the time
dt. The second term is the expected change in total costs if no shock nor state
shift occur. The third term captures the idea that there exists a wealth shock
during the time period dt. Then, by assumption, the durable is purchased and
the state variable is adjusted to the target level a∗. The last term comes from the
possibility of a state shift.24 This causes the expected total costs to shift from
V (xt, ut) to V (xt, ut) where ut 6= ut.
While ut = 0, 1, the equation (2.9) results in the following system of second-order
differential equations
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, 0) + αxxtV 0(xt, 0)− (λ+ r)V (xt, 0) + γ0 [V (xt, 1)− V (xt, 0)]
= −x
2
t
2
− λ(V (a∗, 0) + c), (2.10)
24The optimisation problem could be stated and solved by two different techniques: contingent claims
analysis or stochastic dynamic programming. Even though in most applications they both give identical
decision rules, their assumptions are different concerning discount rates and financial markets. Also, the
interpretation of the equation (2.9) slightly differs. See Dixit & Pindyck (1994) or Pietola (1997) for more
details.
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σ2x2tV
00(xt, 1) + αxxtV 0(xt, 1)− (λ+ r)V (xt, 1) + γ1 [V (xt, 0)− V (xt, 1)]
= −x
2
t
2
− λ(V (a∗, 1) + c).
In Appendix B we show that the algebraic solution for (2.10) is
V (xt, 0) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
A1x
β1 − γ0
γ0 + γ1
C1x
θ1 (2.11)
− 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r))x
2 +
λc
r
,
V (xt, 1) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
A1x
β1 +
γ1
γ0 + γ1
C1x
θ1
− 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r))x
2 +
λc
r
,
in which the roots β1 and θ1 are defined as
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r)
σ2
> 1, (2.12)
θ1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r + γ0 + γ1)
σ2
> β1.
The total cost functions in (2.11) are valid only for x ∈ [s0, a∗]. For some values
of V (xt, ut), a switch of the state will lead to an immediate adjustment. For
example, if xt is in the region [s0, s1], a switch from the high risk state to the low
risk state causes an adjustment. Thus, in the region between s1 and s0 the cost
function V (xt, 0) is a constant and equals V (s0, 0) because xt < s0. In the range
[s1, s0] the system of differential equations degenerates to
V (xt, 0) = V (s0, 0), (2.13)
V (xt, 1) = D1x
µ1 − 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r + γ1))
x2 +
γ1V (a
∗, 0) + (γ1 + λ)c
r + γ1
,
in which the root µ1 is defined as
β1 < µ1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r + γ1)
σ2
< θ1. (2.14)
Economically, the system of cost functions in (2.13) shows the effect of the change
in uncertainty on durable purchases. It also reveals how the consumer will benefit
of the new information and do what is optimal then. If the state of the world is
risky and the state variable is close to the lower band trigger s1, a shift to low
risk will cause an immediate adjustment. If a high number of consumers are close
to this lower band trigger and the state of the economy is high risk, a switch to
the low risk will cause an aggregate investment boom.
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Even though we are not able to find an algebraic solution for the integration con-
stants in (2.11), (2.13) and band triggers (Su, su) , it is possible to find numerical
solution using the following conditions
Smooth− pasting :



V 0(s0, 0) = 0
V 0(s1, 1) = 0
V 0(a∗, 0) = 0
V 0(a∗, 1) = 0
, (2.15)
V alue−matching :
(
V (s0, 0) = V (a
∗, 0) + c
V (s1, 1) = V (a
∗, 1) + c
.
The smooth-pasting conditions require that the derivatives or slopes of the func-
tions meet tangentially at the boundaries and target level under the states
ut = 0, 1. The value-matching conditions match the values of the unknown
function V (xt, u) to those of the known values if the adjustment is made.
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2.4. Increase in Risk and Timing of Purchases
Technically, the smooth-pasting and value-matching conditions enable us to find
numerical solutions for the total cost functions in (2.11) and (2.13). Economically,
the value-matching conditions imply that at the band triggers the temptation to
adjust equals the temptation to wait an instant. This interpretation becomes
more clear if we evaluate the equation (2.9) at the target point a∗ and at the
band trigger su. Following Hassler (1996a) it can be shown (see Appendix C)
that the indifference condition becomes
(au − a∗)2
2
=
1z}|{
rc +
2z}|{
λc +
3z }| {
γu [c+ V (a
∗, u)− V (su, u)] (2.16)
where au − a∗ means the deviation of the state variable from the target level
evaluated at the band trigger point su. The left-hand side is the immediate
temptation to adjust. An adjustment decreases the utility loss from deviating
from the target point. The right-hand side is the temptation to postpone the
purchase an instant dt.26 It has three different parts. If a consumer does not
adjust but invests the amount c in a safe asset, he receives an interest rate yield
during the time dt. This is the first part of the right-hand side. The second one
reflects the possibility of a wealth shock. Delaying the purchase will save one
adjustment if the shock occurs after the time dt. The third term denotes the
possibility of a state shift in economy. If it switches during the instant dt and
a consumer waits until after that instant he can do what is optimal then. This
creates an option value of waiting which is non-negative (see Appendix C).
It is straightforward to analyse the effects of the determinants on the size of
the inaction band [su, a
∗]. From (2.16) it is evident that if the adjustment costs
25See Dixit (1993) for a thorough discussion.
26The left-hand side is interpreted as an instantaneous cost of waiting in Hassler (1996a). The right-hand
side is a value of waiting in Dixit & Pindyck’s (1994) terminology.
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increase, the consumer tolerates a larger deviation from the target before adjust-
ment. The same happens if the probability λ of idiosyncratic risk increases or
the expected time decreases until the personal shock will appear. Even though
the state shift does not occur during the time dt, the decrease in the expected
time until it may appear (or an increase in probability γu) will lead to the wider
inaction band.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
Because of the lack of micro-level data, the formal tests of the (S,s) model are
rare. Ideally, the panel of household data should be long enough to track the
stock of the durables over time so that one can identify times of adjustment,
targets and adjustment triggers together with the information on income, wealth
and heterogeneous characteristics of the households. Also, as pointed out by
Attanasio (1998), it is desirable to follow households over some time to bound
the inaction range by the households that are observed not to adjust. Such data is
difficult to find.27 Also, another reason for the lack of econometric analysis is the
difficulty in defining irreversibility and uncertainty. Concerning the irreversible
mechanism, the only studies that have utilised panel data are Lam (1991), Eberly
(1994), Attanasio (1995) and Foote et al. (2000). In all these studies, however,
there are problems in accounting properly the variables involved in the model.
In this study we used Household Budget Surveys conducted by Statistics Finland.
The data is drawn from four cross-section Surveys made in Finland in the years
1985, 1990, 1994-96 and 1998. The data from 1994-96 is combined from three
annual Surveys and processed such that it can be used as a one cross-section.
The number of households in the Surveys are 8200 in 1985, 8258 in 1990, 6743
in 1994-96 and 4087 in 1998. The respondents in the Surveys were asked several
questions concerning the characteristics of the household, income, liabilities, ed-
ucation, and detailed expenditures in different consumption categories.28 Also,
the respondents were asked if they owned a certain durable. Unfortunately, the
Surveys did not follow the same households over time, and it is not possible to
construct a panel tracking the stock of the durable and evaluate the depreciation
rate together with the wealth position of the households over time.
The information on car ownership is best documented in the data because the
respondents were asked the gross and net markka-value of the acquisition of the
cars as well as the exchange value of the used cars. Also, the information of ex-
penditures on repairs as well as other charges and costs are available. Therefore,
we used the data from the car acquisitions to identify the (S,s) triggers and the
27In fact, the only appropriate large microeconomic data sets are the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
from U.S. and Family Expenditure Survey (FES) from U.K.
28Suoniemi & Sullstro¨m (1995) provide a thorough description of the Surveys and of the change of the
consumption structure in Finland.
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target, and to evaluate the effects of the determinants on them. According to
the data, the households can be categorised as follows.
1. Those who upgrade by buying a used car and give a car in exchange.
2. Those who upgrade by buying a used car without a trade-in car.
3. Those who upgrade by buying a new car and give a car in exchange.
4. Those who upgrade by buying a new car without a trade-in car.
5. Those who upgrade by buying both a used and a new car and give
a car in exchange.
6. Those who downgrade to zero by selling a car.
7. Those who downgrade by selling a car and buy a cheaper one.
8. Those who do not engage in transaction.
For households engaging in a transaction so that they either buy a new or a used
car and give a car in exchange, the width of the lower inaction band is observable.
Correspondingly, the width of the upper band is observable only for those who
downgrade by selling a car and buy a cheaper one. For households that upgrade
by buying either a used or new car without a trade-in car, only the target level
can be identified. For those who downgrade by selling a car, only the upper
trigger can be identified. Due to the limited time-series information for those not
engaging in a transaction, neither the triggers nor the target is observable. In
the following section, these categories are referred to when analysing the data.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Estimation Methods
As a measure of the state variable, we used a ratio of the value of the car to
the disposable income of the household. Even though this measure of wealth
does not properly account for the total lifetime wealth, it still implicitly includes
the unobservable human wealth, the existence of liquidity constraints, and gives
the wealth position of the household. The triggers were calculated by dividing
either the value of the trade-in cars with respect to the households disposable
income depending whether the household updates its durables stock up (lower
trigger, categories 1 and 3) or down (upper trigger, category 7), or with respect
to the selling value of the car (upper trigger, category 6)29. The gross value of
the purchased car with respect to the disposable income gives the target value
for the state variable. Table 1 depicts the means and standard deviations for the
triggers and target, and the number of observations in each categories. The last
panel in Table 1 gives the results for the total number of entries of the triggers
and target. The state variable values higher than one were omitted from the
analysis for practical reasons.30
29In category 6, the low values of the state variable indicate perhaps a sort of a scrap value of the cars
rather than (S,s) behaviour. Then, it is a matter of taste if this trigger should be treated as S or s.
30Typically, each category contained few values which were more than one. In the categories less than
100 observations, these outliers had a substantial effect on mean and standard error (the highest value for
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Table 1
(S,s) target and triggers for state variable calculated
as means in each category
1985 1990 1994-96 1998
Category 1 a∗
0.31
(0.21)
0.34
(0.21)
0.31
(0.21)
0.33
(0.21)
s
0.12
(0.12)
0.13
(0.13)
0.13
(0.13)
0.13
(0.12)
n 886 610 438 285
Category 2 a∗
0.14
(0.15)
0.17
(0.18)
0.15
(0.15)
0.16
(0.16)
n 583 606 396 357
Category 3 a∗
0.53
(0.17)
0.52
(0.21)
0.59
(0.19)
0.60
(0.19)
s
0.25
(0.15)
0.24
(0.16)
0.26
(0.15)
0.27
(0.14)
n 297 227 114 124
Category 4 a∗
0.43
(0.17)
0.43
(0.23)
0.43
(0.23)
0.49
0.22
n 48 67 30 33
Category 6 S
0.09
(0.10)
0.11
(0.16)
0.10
(0.14)
0.14
(0.16)
n 78 82 123 36
Category 7 S
0.21
(0.19)
0.23
(0.18)
0.19
(0.20)
0.18
(0.15)
a∗
0.10
(0.11)
0.14
(0.13)
0.10
(0.12)
0.09
(0.08)
n 74 68 78 34
Total S
0.15
(0.16)
0.17
(0.18)
0.14
(0.17)
0.16
(0.16)
n 152 150 201 70
a∗
0.29
(0.23)
0.30
(0.23)
0.27
(0.23)
0.30
(0.24)
n 1888 1578 1056 833
s
0.15
(0.14)
0.16
(0.15)
0.16
(0.14)
0.17
(0.14)
n 1183 837 552 409
The state variable is the value of the car/disposable income. a∗, S, s and n are
the target, upper and lower triggers and number of observations, correspond−
ingly. Categories are as in Chapter 2. The standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
The results from the categories that reveal the width of the inaction band are
the state variable was 60), and some of them may be a consequence of data processing. Therefore, to make
results comparable over time, the state variable is restricted between zero and one.
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the most interesting. For example, the results from the category 1 imply that on
the average the value of the trade-in cars is allowed to drift down to 13 percent
of the disposable income before adjustment. Then, it is adjusted slightly above
30 percent. This behaviour clearly differs from that of buying a new car and
giving a car in exchange (category 3). These households adjust when the value
of the trade-in car is about one fourth of the disposable income, while the target is
slightly above half. In both cases, the width of the inaction band slightly changes
over time. Households that downgrade by selling a car and buy a cheaper one
(category 7) tolerate the value of the car to increase to one fifth of the disposable
income before adjusting it back to about 10 percent. However, it is noteworthy
that the high standard errors indicate a high cross-sectional heterogeneity of
behaviour.
The common feature across the categories is that, in aggregate, both the triggers
and target seem to be quite stable over time implying only a small variation in
the width of the inaction band. Somehow this is surprising since the Surveys
are from the years of different economic circumstances. In Finland, in 1985
financial markets were regulated, in 1990 there was a boom and overheating of
the economy, while the years 1994-96 and 1998 were times of economic recovery
along with a high rate of unemployment. Casually, however, only the year 1990
seems to be an exception. The lower band width for the category 1 is slightly
higher, and the upper trigger and target for the category 7 is somewhat higher
compared to other years.
After identifying the upper and lower band width, we focused on the implication
of the (S,s) model. That is, an increase in the adjustment costs and uncertainty
leads households to purchase a durable less frequently. While the heterogeneous
adjustment costs including searching and information costs, commissions to bro-
kers etc. cannot be observed from the cross-sectional data, we use instead pure
cost measures which are available in the Surveys, and which are assumed to have
an effect on the timing of the purchases. These repair costs include expenditures
on repair pairs, accessories, maintenance and other repairing. A higher rate of
depreciation will indicate more need for repairing, which should lead to more
frequent adjustment.
A problem for the applied econometrician is the identification and integration of
uncertainty into the theory. Even though the theoretical model assumed idiosyn-
chratic risk to follow Poisson process with immediate adjustment after the shock
occurs, such behaviour is difficult to capture empirically. Instead, we study how
idiosynchratic risk effects on the width of the inaction band. To measure the
household-level uncertainty we used two distinct methods.31 Following Eberly
(1994) the first method builds on the difference between actual and predicted
disposable income. First, we regressed disposable income of each household on
31See Carruth et al. (2000) who give a survey of uncertainty proxies in irreversible investment research.
In time-series and panel data the conditional variances of the underlying variables (such as the growth rates
of income, stock prices and inflation) are typical proxies.
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a number of household characteristics including socio-economic status, province,
local authority, total months of unemployed, type of the household, educational
attainment and gender of the household head.32 Then, we used these coefficients
to impute a predicted income for each household in the Surveys. Finally, we
calculated the difference between the actual and predicted disposable income,
and used it as a measure of uncertainty. The advantage of this method is that it
takes into account the households’ heterogeneous characteristics. For example, if
some of the household members are unemployed, it is reasonable to assume that
the households’ income is less than that of reference income, thus, affecting on
the willingness to adjust the durable back to the target level.
The shortcoming of this method, however, is that the measured uncertainty has
an asymmetric effect on the purchases. If the disposable income of the household
is higher than that of predicted (that is, the residual is positive), the household
can be assumed to be better-off than the average and it may be more willingness
to update the durable back to the target sooner than those of the worse-off
households. Thus, it is reasonably to assume that the coefficients for the worse-
off households should be positive and statistically significant indicating a wider
inaction band, while the coefficients for the better-off households are assumed to
be statistically negative or insignificant.
While this measure of household-level uncertainty based on the residual method
above may be questioned for many reasons33, we added other cross-sectional
factors that may be related to the households uncertainty concerning the future.
These are housing debt and expenditures on health.34 The magnitude of both of
these measures implicitly include a sort of uncertainty.
The second method is based on the Harvey’s (1976) multiplicative heteroskedas-
ticity, which can be seen as an stochastic volatility type method without the
time-dimension structure in error terms. Analysis of the OLS residuals of the
first method reveals that depending on the Survey the error variance is mostly
related to the education of the household head and/or socio-economic status of
the household. Therefore, the skedastic function is
σ2M,i = exp (β0 + β1Dummy(Education)i + β2Dummy(Status)i) , (4.1)
where i denotes each household in the Survey. The maximum likelihood esti-
mation procedure involves deriving first derivatives of the log-likelihood function
32The regression results from these dummy variables are available from the author by request. See Ap-
pendix D for the description of the variables. We also tried other candidates which may affect the disposable
income such as education of the spouse. For all of these, however, the coefficients turned out to be statistically
insignificant.
33For example, Pagan (1986) has shown that in time-series analysis these two-stage/step regressions with
expectations provide consistent parameter estimates but the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates
is usually inconsistent. To correct the estimation, one should use instrument variables. Even when such
expectations of the future variables do not exist explicitly in our cross-sectional regressions, it is likely to
assume that there may exist a sort of inconsistency in the variances of the parameter values as well.
34Instead of housing debt in 1985 we use total debt because of the lack of data.
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with respect to mean equation parameters and skedastic function parameters.
The resulting conditional variance estimates (
∧
σ
2
i ) were used as a proxy of the
household-level uncertainty and entered as regressors in the band estimation.
The analysis above utilises only a subset of the Surveys disregarding the cate-
gories 2, 4, 6 and 8, that is, the households who only sell or buy a car, or do
not engage in transaction at all. Thus, it is fertile to include these observations
into the analysis to identify the effect of uncertainty and repair costs on the
probability of transaction. To evaluate this behaviour, the third method is based
on a probit analysis to get the adjustment probits. However, while the Surveys
include households which are heterogeneous in their characteristics, the standard
probit estimation generates parameter coefficients which are both biased and
inconsistent. To improve the statistical performance of the estimates, we used
heteroskedastic probit model, where the skedastic function is
σ2P,i = exp(β1DIi)
2. (4.2)
DIi is the disposable income of the household explaining the variation in the
error terms.35
4.2. Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the results of the determinants on the lower band width based
on the residual method. While it is difficult to interpret quantitatively the stan-
dard linear regression coefficients, we regressed log-linearized versions which give
the direct percent changes in the band width. All the independent variables
in the model were divided by the disposable income to scale the variables and
to get consistent measurement units in regression. To control the asymmetric
behaviour between the worse-off and better-off households, we added dummies
for the constant and uncertainty (Dconstant and Dincome) for the better-off
households.
According to the results, all the intercepts were statistically significant for the
worse-off households. The intercepts for the better-off households differed from
those of the worse-off only for the years 1985 and 1990 indicating a narrower
inaction band.36 The measured income uncertainty effect was statistically sig-
nificant for both household types only for the years 1985 and 1990. In 1985 an
increase of one percent in the income uncertainty increased the lower band width
for 6.3 percent for the worse-off households but decreased it for 6.9 percent for
the better-off households. These results did not reject the (S,s) model. The other
35See Harvey (1976) or Greene (2003) for a theoretical justification of the methods.
36The exclusion of some of the regressors did not change the statistical interpretations for the remaining
coefficients. The sum of the constant and Dconstant, and the sum of Income and Dincome are the intercept
and the coefficient of the measured income uncertainty for the better-off households, respectively. The
antilogs of the intercepts give the standard constant terms.
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uncertainty variables (housing debt and health) seemed not to perform well sta-
tistically, except for the years 1994-96, which seemed to generate reverse results
in general. An increase in housing debt with respect to the disposable income
seemed to decrease the band width, but statistically this was significant only in
1994-1996. As expected, throughout the Surveys an increase in repair costs typi-
cally seemed to decrease the inaction band for few percents, but these coefficients
did not either differ statistically from zero. The coefficient of determination (R2)
was typically less than 0.10.
Table 2
Determinants of lower band width, residual approach
Dependent variable is log(a∗ − s)
1985 1990 1994-96 1998
Constant
-1.741∗∗
(0.129)
-1.568∗∗
(0.156)
-1.835∗∗
(0.188)
-1.833∗∗
(0.243)
Dconstant
-0.333∗∗
(0.103)
-0.406∗∗
(0.127)
0.209
0.167
-0.096
(0.220)dIncome 0.063∗
(0.032)
0.096∗∗
(0.040)
-0.079∗
(0.048)
0.022
(0.065)dDincome -0.132∗∗
(0.043)
-0.159∗∗
(0.057)
0.087
(0.076)
-0.042
(0.105)
Debt
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.011∗
(0.007)
-0.024∗∗
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.010)
Health
-0.010
(0.015)
0.028
(0.024)
0.044∗
(0.023)
0.029
(0.022)
Repair
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.011)
0.026∗∗
(0.013)
-0.025
(0.019)
n1 542 399 266 184
n2 641 438 286 225
Income is the absolute value of the difference between predicted and observed dis−
posable income. All the regressors are divided by the disposable income and are in
logarithms. n1 and n2 denote the number of the worse−off and better−off house−
holds, respectively. The asterisks ∗ and ∗∗ denote that the coefficients differ statisti−
cally from zero at 10% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. The standard
errors in parantheses are heteroskedasticitycorrected.
Table 3 presents the corresponding results for the upper band width. The com-
mon feature of these results is that they performed poorly statistically. In most
cases we even cannot reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero (Sur-
vey 1990). Except of the intercepts, only the income uncertainty for the worse-off
households in years 1985 and 1994-96 were statistically significant. The magni-
tude of these coefficients, however, was unconvincing. Even though the coeffi-
cients of the other uncertainty measures typically had the right sign, statistically
they were irrelevant for the width of the upper band. Also, the coefficients for
the repair costs had mostly the expected sign, but they did not differ statisti-
cally from zero. The coefficients of determination for the regressions were low.
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Nevertheless, the number of observations is small and one should avoid making
too strict interpretations of the results.
Table 3
Determinants of upper band width, residual approach
Dependent variable is log(S − a∗)
1985 1990 1994-96 1998
Constant
-5.673∗∗
(1.651)
-2.540
(1.878)
-2.667∗∗
(1.187)
-5.572∗
(3.360)
Dconstant
-0.047
(1.700)
1.098
(2.116)
-0.579
(1.393)
1.342
(2.583)dIncome -0.542∗∗
(0.261)
-0.069
(0.667)
0.920∗∗
(0.325)
0.014
(1.121)dDincome -0.280
(0.651)
0.846
(1.036)
-0.264
(0.703)
-0.267
(1.201)
Debt
0.170
(0.135)
-0.015
(0.087)
0.048
(0.068)
0.175
(0.130)
Health
0.072
(0.240)
0.281
(0.324)
0.033
(0.166)
-0.218
(0.192)
Repair
-0.074
(0.152)
0.054
(0.128)
-0.065
(0.102)
-0.028
(0.191)
n1 43 41 43 15
n2 31 27 35 19
See Table 2.
Based on the multiplicative heteroskedasticity approach, Table 4 gives the results
both on the upper and lower band widths. Again, the independent variables were
scaled by the disposable income, and the log-linearised version of the models
were estimated.37 The results seemed highly consistent with those in Tables 2
and 3 with one exception: the model for the lower band width in 1994-96 seemed
to fit the data well. The other coefficients and their statistical interpretations
were closely related to those of Tables 2 and 3. Again, the magnitude and the
statistical relevance of the coefficients for the upper band width were dubious
because of the small sample properties in estimation. An interesting feature
was revealed by the coefficients for the housing debt ratio: an increase in this
ratio seemed to increase the upper inaction band while decreasing the lower
one. Typically, these coefficients, however, did not statistically differ from zero.
Also, the coefficients for repairing costs were generally of the expected sign, but
were statistically insignificant. Even though not reported, the coefficients of the
37Instead of log(
∧
σ
2
i ) the uncertainty measure is also scaled like the other explationary variables, and is
log(
∧
σ
2
i /DIi), where DIi is the disposable income of the household. When regressing the model without
scaling the variables involved in the model, the results were in accordance with those reported in Table 4.
Thus, the scaling does not distort the statistical significance and interpretations of the parameters.
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skedastic equation (4.1) turned out to be statistically significant at 5% level of
significance.
Table 4
Determinants of band width when uncertainty is based on
multiplicative heteroskedasticity approach
Regressors (in logs)
Band Constant log (
∧
σ
2
M,i /DIi) Debt Health Repair
1985 Upper
5.424
(7.796)
-1.027
(0.836)
0.186
(0.129)
0.126
(0.239)
-0.046
(0.142)
Lower
-4.319∗∗
(0.503)
0.267∗∗
(0.054)
0.004
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.009)
1990 Upper
-2.996
(4.685)
-0.022
(0.411)
-0.022
(0.084)
0.236
(0.319)
0.015
(0.122)
Lower
-2.941∗∗
(0.431)
0.123∗∗
(0.043)
-0.011∗
(0.006)
0.036
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.011)
1994-96 Upper
1.976
(5.482)
-0.678
(0.584)
0.008
(0.072)
0.079
(0.184)
-0.096
(0.107)
Lower
-3.149∗∗
(0.648)
0.156∗∗
(0.066)
-0.018∗∗
(0.009)
0.041∗
(0.023)
-0.027∗∗
(0.013)
1998 Upper
0.593
(6.799)
-0.484
(0.642)
0.215∗
(0.120)
-0.190
(0.204)
0.020
(0.214)
Lower
-2.722∗∗
(0.547)
0.080∗
(0.048)
-0.012
(0.010)
0.027
(0.022)
-0.026
(0.019)
See Table 2.
Table 5 presents the results from the heteroskedastic probit analysis. The uncer-
tainty measure was calculated as in equation (4.2). The first row corresponding
to each Surveys gives the standard probit estimates. The second row reports the
marginal effects around the means of the independent variables.
With a few exceptions, the coefficients were statistically significant either in 10
percent or 5 percent level of significance. Except for the year 1990, the effect
of an increase in uncertainty on the probability of adjusting was negative, as
predicted by the (S,s) model. An increase in housing debt, on the other hand,
had a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of purchase, which
seems to contradict the theory. The health effect had negative effect while an
increase in repair costs affected positively on the probability to adjust. Both
of these were in accordance with the theory. The likelihood-ratio (LR) test
of heteroskedasticity which tests the model with heteroskedasticity against the
model without it was highly significant in all cases. Even though the coefficients
for the uncertainty term differed statistically from zero, their magnitude on the
probability of adjustment was only few percents.
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Table 5
Maximum likelihood estimates from heteroskedastic probit model
Regressors
Constant
∧σ
2
P,i Debt Health Repair LR
1985
-2.056∗
(1.223)
-0.013
(0.115)
0.304∗∗
(0.045)
-2.509∗∗
(0.921)
0.191
(0.379)
121.62
-0.001
(0.011)
0.030∗∗
(0.004)
-0.245∗∗
(0.090)
0.019
(0.037)
1990
-2.887∗∗
(0.639)
0.092
(0.057)
0.133∗∗
(0.030)
-1.034
(0.813)
4.184∗∗
(0.655)
165.45
0.011∗
(0.006)
0.015∗∗
(0.004)
-0.123
(0.098)
0.498∗∗
(0.075)
1994-96
1.073∗∗
(0.356)
-0.234∗∗
(0.034)
0.053∗
(0.028)
-0.849
(0.728)
0.886∗∗
(0.356)
39.05
-0.044∗∗
(0.007)
0.010∗
(0.005)
-0.159
(0.136)
0.166∗∗
(0.059)
1998
-0.140
(0.541)
-0.139∗∗
(0.051)
0.177∗∗
(0.055)
-4.614∗∗
(1.161)
1.043∗∗
(0.477)
91.67
-0.019∗∗
(0.007)
0.024∗∗
(0.008)
-0.630∗∗
(0.155)
0.142∗∗
(0.065)
See Table 2. The 5% critical value for the LR test is χ2(1) = 3,84.
This held true also for the housing debt. Instead, the measures of health and
repair costs generated probabilities, which seem somewhat unreasonably large:
the estimates indicate even as large as 60 percent effect on the probability of
adjustment.
4.3. Discussion and Evaluation of Results
The interpretation of the above results is not straightforward and requires discus-
sion. A major failure of the results concerning the estimates on the upper band
width are most likely related to the small number of observations and, therefore,
the estimates cannot give a reliable picture of the adjustment behaviour and they
should be interpreted as preliminary rather than strictly concluding.38 On the
other hand, the estimates for the lower band width as well as the estimates for
the probability of adjustment give more plausible explanation between the un-
certainty and on the frequency of adjustment. Even though the residual method
dividing the households into two groups - worse-off and better-off households -
was able to found statistically significant evidence only for the years 1985 and
1990, the other methods found more systematic significance. According to these
results, a percent increase in uncertainty increases the inaction band more than
38As mentioned earlier, the low values of the state variable may indicate a scrap value of the vehicle rather
than voluntary adjustment.
25
10 percent while an unit increase in uncertainty decreases the probability of ad-
justment for few percents. Even though the magnitude of the latter result seems
to be more realistic than the former, both are in favour of the (S,s) model.
The other uncertainty measures generated ambiguous results. The coefficients of
the housing debt on the band width and on the adjustment probabilities were
typically either statistically insignificant or of the wrong sign. This is hard to
interpret. We also tried total debt as a regressor, but the results were parallel.
One explanation for the latter is that in Finland the expensive net purchases (such
as cars) are typically financed by taking out a loan, thus, generating a positive
correlation between the borrowings and net purchases. The regression results
based on the amount of total consumer credit support this insight. Also, while
the expenditures on health certainly describe a kind of individual uncertainty and
even though the estimates are of the right sign and in accordance with the (S,s)
model, statistically they cannot explain the behaviour in automobile market.
The negative sign of the coefficients for the repair cost indicating a sort of depre-
ciation of the cars turned out to be in favour of the infrequent adjustment theory.
However, only in few cases the effect on the inaction band width was statisti-
cally significant. Instead, an increase in repair costs had a statistically significant
positive effect on the probability of adjustment. When adding other user costs
(automobile tax, inspection fee, traffic insurance charge and other costs includ-
ing expenditures on gasoline) to explain the effect on the inaction band width,
the coefficients turned out to be positive but statistically insignificant. On the
other hand, the effect on the adjustment probabilities was even more statistically
consequential than the pure repair cost effect.
One explanation for the poor performance of the regressors on the width of the
inaction bands is the possibility that the regressors have a parallel effect both on
the triggers and target which remains the band width unchanged, but changes
the location of the whole (S,s) band. To control this possibility we run separate
regressions for the triggers and target (results are not reported). According to
these results, however, the different uncertainty measures as well as the repair
costs seem not to have a statistically significant effect on the location of the (S,s)
band. Only on few cases, the coefficients became statistically significant, but not
systematically.
So far we have not discussed anything concerning the effect of general economic
situation in Finland on the estimation results. The Household Budget Surveys
are collected under different economic circumstances and it is reasonable to as-
sume that the economic environment matters on the intertemporal consumption
decisions. To evaluate the effect of the general economic confidence, Figure 4.1
presents two different indicators concerning the expectations of future in Fin-
land. The first is Finnish industrial confidence indicator (FICI) collected by the
Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers, and the second is consumer
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confidence indicator (CCI) supplied by Statistics Finland39. Both indicators re-
veal that years 1985 and 1990 contained more systematic risk concerning the
future than the later years. Especially, the end of year 1990 generated nega-
tive expectations reflecting the forthcoming deep depression in Finland. The
expectations were most positive in 1994 according to the economic outlook. CCI
considers year 1998 to contain least uncertainty with respect to the other years.
Figure 4.1: Economic Outlook and Consumer Confidence Survey
Although it is suspected that the investment decisions will be more sensitive to
variations in household-level uncertainty than to increases in risk which affects
all households in general, the occasional dominance of the latter may result to
behaviour which cannot be revealed from the estimation. This insight can explain
some of the statistical performance of the income uncertainty on the inaction
band width. The income uncertainty was statistically significant in years 1985
and 1990 (high risk according to the indicators) while in 1998 (low risk according
to the indicators) it was hard to find connection between income uncertainty
and frequence of adjustment. This observation justifies also the assumption that
the household-level uncertainty and the general economic situation may be highly
correlated. Thus, while no household-level uncertainty exists as such, the general
negative expectations of the future may induce precautionary saving behaviour
which the cross-sectional data cannot reveal.
39Consumer confidence indicator was collected semiannually since 1987. In 1991-1995 it was collected
quarterly and monthly thereafter.
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Most earlier empirical studies of durable purchases were based on the aggregate
consumption data (see Bertola & Caballero (1990), Caballero (1990, 1993) and
Hassler (2001), among others). Evidently, this was because of the lack of ap-
propriate micro-level data. However, there are few studies which have utilized
individual data. Lam (1991) used threshold adjustment model and panel data
to study the consumption behaviour in an automobile market. He found that
the resale market imperfections and liquidity constraints have important effects
on automobile expenditures. Also, the upward adjustments are substantially
quicker than downward adjustments. His interpretation of this asymmetry in
differencies between the upper and lower bands from the desired level implies
that the efficiency of policy depends on its direction. A policy change that in-
creases the desired stock can be expected to be more effective than a policy that
reduces the desired stock by the same magnitude. Using U.S. panel data on auto-
mobile purchases, Eberly (1994) conducted similar results regarding an increase
in uncertainty. One of her findings was that the width of the inaction band is
positively related to the income variability. Carroll & Dunn (1997) studied the
effect of an unemployment risk on durable and nondurable spending and house-
hold balance sheets. They found that the durable expenditures are very robustly
correlated with lagged unemployed expectations. Dunn (1998) used household
level data from 1983 and 1992 and found similar results to that of Eberly (1994):
households with a higher probability of becoming unemployed are less likely to
have recently purchased home or an automobile. Thus, the inaction range will
be wider for those who face greater unemployment risk.
Using Finnish quarterly data from 1979 to 1992 and the conditional variance of
the innovations in the aggregate income and the change in unemployment rate
as a source of systematic risk, Koivuma¨ki (1999) found statistical evidence that
increased income uncertainty has suppressed consumption growth in Finland.
Also, he found a negative relationship between consumption and unemployment
rate. Correspondingly, Foote et al. (2000), using adjustment probits and panel of
U.S. automobile holdings, found that more variable income leads to less frequent
adjustment while more miles driving indicating a greater rate of depreciation
leads households to adjust more often. All of these findings are in accordance
to our findings and support the (S,s) behaviour. The only exception to these
mainstream conclusions is Attanasio (2000) who showed that it is difficult to
characterise the time-series properties of aggregate expenditure from the esti-
mated (S,s) rules.
Even though we found some evidence of the importance of uncertainty to post-
pone automobile purchases, it is likely to assume that all the identified uncer-
tainty measures and repair costs are not adequate proxies to emulate the real
uncertainty and depreciation rate, respectively. To obtain more reliable results,
one should improve the data by bringing time structure into the empirical anal-
ysis. While such microeconomic data does not exist, one fertile approach may
be to construct an artificial panel by dividing each Survey into the groups, say,
according to the income deciles, and then follow each group over time to study if
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the income variance of the groups have any effect on adjustment. Evidently, this
approach needs restrictive assumptions of preferences and may lead to the fur-
ther problems, for example, because of the households movement between income
deciles. Also, the other long-lived durables should be used to test the validity of
the (S,s) model. These are, however, left for the further research.
5. CONCLUSION
This study investigated implications of uncertainty, depreciation and adjustment
costs on the timing of adjustment and purchases of durable goods. The model
based on the (S,s) rule extended the theoretical framework by Hassler (1994,
1996a) by deriving an (S,s) rule explicitly from the Cobb-Douglas preferences.
The model states that an agent has a desire to keep a certain fraction of his
wealth to be invested in one (expensive) durable. Because of the depreciation
of the good and stochastic movements in prices and agent’s wealth over time,
the actual level of fraction deviates from that of target. While the continuous
updating is costly and the purchases include costs that are at least partially
irreversible, it is optimal for an agent to allow an inaction band around the
frictionless target and not to adjust until the actual fraction goes outside the
band. Including the possibility of idiosynchratic and systematic risk, the model
states that the width of the inaction band is positively related to the systematic
risk. An increase in risk increases the option value of waiting, and the purchases
are postponed to the future. On the other hand, a greater depreciation should
lead to more frequent adjustment.
Using four different cross-sectional Household Budget Surveys from the years
1985, 1990, 1994-96 and 1998, the empirical consumption behaviour based on
the Finnish automobile purchases was in most cases in favour of the (S,s) rule.
A percent increase in household-level income uncertainty increases the inaction
band more than 10 percent, while an unit increase in uncertainty decreases the
probability of adjustment with few percents. The other uncertainty measures
- housing debt and expenditures on health - did not perform well statistically,
and typically did not affect on the width of the inaction band. An increase in
depreciation of automobiles measured by repair costs increases the probability of
adjustment, which is consistent with the infrequent adjustment theory.
The finding that income uncertainty has a large role in household’s decision-
making and affects intertemporal consumption behaviour is not surprising, but
the results help to understand better the effect of uncertainty on the magnitude
of saving and business cycles. While the lack of data prevented us to study other
uncertainty measures, durable goods and the dynamic nature of the purchases,
it is likely to assume that including these elements into the study would even
strengthen the importance of uncertainty on the timing of durable purchases.
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APPENDIX A
Proposition:
If the variables P , W and C are evolving over time according to the following
geometric Brownian motions
dW
W
= αWdt+ δwdzW , (A.1)
dP
P
= αPdt+ δPdzP ,
dC
C
= −αCdt,
then the function at(Pt, Ct,Wt) =
PtCt
Wt
follows geometric Brownian motion
da
a
= αadt+ δadza. (A.2)
The terms α and δ may be interpreted as drift and variance parameters of the
processes, respectively. Especially, the term αC is the rate of depreciation. The
terms dz are the increments of a Wiener process such that dzk = εk
√
dt. While
εk ∼ N(0, 1), E (dzk) = 0 and V ar (dzk) = E
h
(dzk)
2
i
− [E (dzk)]2 = dt.
Proof:
In this proof we apply the Fundamental Theorem of stochastic calculus which
is expanded to functions of several Ito processes.40 In general, in the presence
of several Wiener processes the differential dF for a function F (t, x1, ..., xm) is
given as
dF =
∂F
∂t
dt+
X
i
∂F
∂xi
dxi +
1
2
X
i
X
j
∂2F
∂xi∂xj
dxidxj (A.3)
where dxi and dxj, i, j = 1, ...,m; i 6= j, are independent Ito processes. Inserting
the derivatives and noting that there does not exist time explicitly in the function
a(P,C,W ), the expression (A.3) becomes
da =
µ
C
W
dP +
P
W
dC − PC
W 2
dW
¶
+
1
2
½
1
W
(dP )(dC) (A.4)
− C
W 2
(dP )(dW ) +
1
W
(dC)(dP )− P
W 2
(dC)(dW ) +
2PC
W 3
(dW )2
− C
W 2
(dW )(dP )− P
W 2
(dW )(dC)
¾
=
C
W
dP +
P
W
dC − PC
W 2
dW +
1
W
(dP )(dC)− C
W 2
(dP )(dW )
− P
W 2
(dC)(dW ) +
2PC
W 3
(dW )2.
40See Malliaris & Brock (1982) and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) who give more background for the stochastic
calculus and describe the properties of the Ito processes in more detail.
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After substituting the Ito processes from (A.1) the expanded form of the equation
becomes
da =
C
W
(αPPdt+ δPPdzP )−
P
W
(αCCdt) (A.5)
−PC
W 2
(αWWdt+ δWWdzW )−
1
W
(αPPdt+ δPPdzP ) (αCCdt)
− C
W 2
(αPPdt+ δPPdzP ) (αWWdt+ δWWdzW )
+
P
W 2
(αCCdt) (αWWdt+ δWWdzW ) +
2PC
W 3
(αWWdt+ δWWdzW )
2 .
All the terms (dt)
3
2 and (dt)2 go to zero faster than dt as time increments become
infinitesimal small, so these terms are ignored. Noting that the term E [dzidzj] =
ρijdt is the coefficient of correlation
41 between the two processes the expression
can be rewritten as
da =
PC
W
(αP − αC − αW ) dt+
PC
W
(δPdzP − δWdzW ) (A.6)
−PC
W
δP δWρPWdt+
2PC
W
δ2Wdt
=
h
αP − αC − αW − δP δWρPW + 2δ2W
i
adt+ [δPdzP − δWdzW ] a
= αaadt+ δaadza.
This is the equation (2.3) in the main text. It is easy to show that the mean and
the variance of this process are
E
Ã
da
a
!
= αadt, (A.7)
V ar
Ã
da
a
!
= E
h
(da)2
i
−E [(da)]2 = δ2adt.
APPENDIX B
Suppose that each time increment is of length ∆t and denote xt = at − a∗, then
∆x = ∆a. The Bellman equation for the problem is
V (xt, ut) =
x2t
2
∆t+ e−r∆tEt [V (xt+∆t, ut+∆t)] , (B.1)
in which V (xt, ut) denotes the total cost function and V (xt+∆t, ut+∆t) = V (xt +
∆x, t+∆t, u+∆u). Using the approximation e−r∆t ≈ (1+r∆t)−1 and multiplying
41Note that because Wiener processes have variances and standard deviations per unit of time equal to
one, ρij is also the covariance per unit of time between the processes.
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(B.1) with the term (1 + r∆t) gives
rV (xt, ut)∆t =
x2t
2
∆t(1 + r∆t) +Et [V (xt+∆t, ut+∆t)− V (xt, ut)] (B.2)
=
x2t
2
∆t(1 + r∆t) +Et [dV ] .
Dividing by ∆t and letting it approach zero we get
rV (xt, ut) =
x2t
2
+
1
dt
Et [dV ] . (B.3)
The right-hand side of the equation can be interpreted as a current flow of disutil-
ity plus the expected rate of change of the total cost function. Using the version
of Ito’s lemma for combined Brownian and Poisson processes42, the expectation
of the differential V is given by
E [dV ] =
·
αxtV
0(xt, ut) +
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, ut) + h.o.t
¸
dt (B.4)
+λ [(V (a∗, ut) + c)− V (xt, ut)] dt+ γu [V (xt, ut)− V (xt, ut)] dt,
where h.o.t means higher order terms which approach zero faster than dt as
dt → 0. These terms are omitted. The second term on the right-hand side
captures the idea that a Poisson shock occurs with probability λdt. Then, by
assumption, the variable a is adjusted back to the target level a∗ after the lumpy
sum cost is paid. Note that while the immediate utility loss is zero at the target
level, the term V (a∗, ut) 6= 0 because of the expectation of the future deviations
from the target. The term γu is the probability of the switch of the economy.
If the switch occurs during the time increment dt, then the expected total costs
shift from V (xt, ut) to V (xt, ut).
43 Inserting the previous equation to (B.3) we
get
1
2
σ2x2V 00(xt, ut) + αxV 0(xt, ut)− (λ+ r)V (xt, ut) + γu [V (xt, ut)− V (xt, ut)]
= −x
2
t
2
− λ (V (a∗, ut) + c) . (B.5)
While ut = 0, 1, (B.5) constitutes a system of two second-order differential equa-
tions with two unknown functions. Even though this system is quite complex its
set of solutions can be found using the following procedure. The system of the
second-order differential equations can be rewritten as
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, 0) + αxtV 0(xt, 0)− (λ+ r)V (xt, 0) + γ0 [V (xt, 1)− V (xt, 0)]
42See Dixit & Pindyck (1994), Merton (1999) or Cochrane (2000) for a thorough mathematical treatment.
43To be precise, the terms V (a∗, ut) and V (xt, ut) should be written as V (0, ut+1) and V (xt, ut+1) to
capture the idea of a jump or a switch between the times t and t+ 1. However, in an infinite context these
two are equal. Also, at the target level the state variable is xt = a
∗ − a∗ = 0. To avoid confusion later on,
however, we use the notation V (a∗, ut) to describe the (expected) total costs at the target level when the
state of the economy is ut.
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= −x
2
t
2
− λ (V (a∗, 0) + c) , (B.6)
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, 1) + αxtV 0(xt, 1)− (λ+ r)V (xt, 1) + γ1 [V (xt, 0)− V (xt, 1)]
= −x
2
t
2
− λ (V (a∗, 1) + c) .
This is the equation (2.10) in the main text. Define two new functions (without
the subscripts) such that
K(x) = V (xt, 0)− V (xt, 1), (B.7)
J(x) =
V (xt, 1)
γ1
+
V (xt, 0)
γ0
.
Then
1
2
σ2x2K 00(x) + αxK 0(x)− (λ+ r + γ0 + γ1)K(x) (B.8)
= λ (V (a∗, 0)− V (a∗, 1)) ,
1
2
σ2x2J 00(x) + αxJ 0(x)− (λ+ r)J(x)
= −γ0 + γ1
2γ0γ1
x2 − λ
Ã
1
γ0
(V (a∗, 0) + c) +
1
γ1
(V (a∗, 1) + c)
!
.
The first equation comes from subtracting the first equation from the second
in (B.6) and using (B.7). Adding up the equations in (B.6) and using (B.7)
results the second equation in (B.8). Each of the equations in (B.8) yields an
‘independent’ solution. Consider the second equation in (B.8) and guess that the
solution for the homogeneous part is of the general form
J(x) = Axβ, (B.9)
where A is a constant to be determined. Then, the homogeneous part can be
rewritten as
Axβ
µ
1
2
σ2β2 + (α− 1
2
σ2)β − (λ+ r)
¶
| {z } = 0
Qβ(β)
. (B.10)
The roots of the fundamental quadratic Qβ(β) are
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r)
σ2
> 1, (B.11)
β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r)
σ2
< 0.
Thus, the general solution of the homogeneous part is
JH(x) = A1x
β1 +A2x
β2 . (B.12)
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Qβ
$2 < 0 $1 > 1
$
Qβ(0) = −(8+r)
Qβ($)
1
Figure B1 : Fundamental Quadratic
The parameter A2 can be determined as follows. Evaluating the fundamental
quadratic at points (0,1) results Qβ(0) = −(λ+r) < 0 and Qβ(1) = α−(λ+r) <
0.44 Thus, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0. This result can be understood from the figure
B1. The limiting behaviour near zero gives one condition. When a is expected
to remain at its target value, there is no utility and adjustment costs. This gives
the condition J(0) = 0. However, when a→ a∗, that is, when x→ 0 and β2 < 0,
the term A2x
β2 → ∞. To ensure that J(x) goes to zero as x → 0, we set the
coefficient of the negative power of x equal to zero, that is, A2 = 0.
The particular solution can be found by using the method of undetermined co-
efficients. Guess that the solution is of the form
J(x) = B2x
2 +B1x+B0. (B.13)
Inserting the correspondent derivates to (B.8) and comparing the coefficients
result
B2 = −
γ0 + γ1
2γ0γ1(σ
2 + 2α− (λ+ r) , (B.14)
B1 = 0,
B0 =
λ
λ+ r
Ã
1
γ0
(V (a∗, 0) + c) +
1
γ1
(V (a∗, 1) + c)
!
.
44The assumption α < λ+ r ensures that there exists finite time when it is optimal to adjust. Otherwise,
waiting longer would always be a better policy, and the optimum would not exist. See Dixit & Pindyck
(1994, pp.137-138, pp.171-173) for illustrative calculations.
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The general solution for J(x) is
J(x) = A1x
β1 − γ0 + γ1
2γ0γ1(σ
2 + 2α− (λ+ r)x
2 (B.15)
+
λ
λ+ r
Ã
1
γ0
(V (a∗, 0) + c) +
1
γ1
(V (a∗, 1) + c)
!
.
Consider next the first equation in (B.8). Following the same steps as above the
homogeneous part can be rewritten as
Cxθ
µ
1
2
σ2θ2 + (α− 1
2
σ2)θ − η
¶
| {z } = 0,
Qθ(θ)
(B.16)
where η = λ+ r+γ0+γ1. Thus, the general solution of the homogeneous part is
KH(x) = C1x
θ1 + C2x
θ2, (B.17)
where the roots are
θ1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r + γ0 + γ1)
σ2
> β1, (B.18)
θ2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r + γ0 + γ1)
σ2
< β2.
It is easy to show that Qθ(0) < Qβ(0) < 0 and Qθ(1) < Qβ(1) < 0. This results
θ1 > β1 > 1 and θ2 < β2 < 0. The coefficients C1 and C2 can be determined as
above, leaving only C1 to be determined. The particular solution is easy to find.
It is
KP (x) = −
λ [V (a∗, 1)− V (a∗, 0)]
η
. (B.19)
The general solution for K(x) is
K(x) = C1x
θ1 − λ [V (a
∗, 1)− V (a∗, 0)]
η
. (B.20)
The solutions for V (xt, 0) and V (xt, 1) can be found by using (B.7), (B.15) and
(B.20). Thus,
V (xt, 0) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
(
A1x
β1 − γ0 + γ1
2γ0γ1(σ
2 + 2α− (λ+ r)x
2 (B.21)
+
λ
λ+ r
Ã
1
γ0
(V (a∗, 0) + c) +
1
γ1
(V (a∗, 1) + c)
!)
− γ0
γ0 + γ1
(
C1x
θ1 − λ [V (a
∗, 1)− V (a∗, 0)]
η
)
,
V (xt, 1) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
(
A1x
β1 − γ0 + γ1
2γ0γ1(σ
2 + 2α− (λ+ r)x
2
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+
λ
λ+ r
Ã
1
γ0
(V (a∗, 0) + c) +
1
γ1
(V (a∗, 1) + c)
!)
+
γ1
γ0 + γ1
(
C1x
θ1 − λ [V (a
∗, 1)− V (a∗, 0)]
η
)
.
The functions V (a∗, 0) and V (a∗, 1) can be found by evaluating (B.21) at the
point a∗ (then x = 0). After some rigorous calculus45, the solution becomes
V (xt, 0) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
A1x
β1 − 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r)x
2 (B.22)
− γ0
γ0 + γ1
C1x
θ1 +
λc
r
,
V (xt, 1) =
γ0γ1
γ0 + γ1
A1x
β1 − 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r)x
2
+
γ1
γ0 + γ1
C1x
θ1 +
λc
r
.
This is the equation (2.11) in the main text. However, the equation (B.22) is
valid only in the range xt ∈ [s0, a∗]. If the state of the economy is low (ut = 0)
and xt ≤ s0, the durable is immediately adjusted. Also, it the state variable is
in the range [s1, s0], a switch from the high risk state to the low risk state will
cause an immediate adjustment. Thus, V (xt, 0) is a constant for xt ∈ [s1, s0].
The system of differential equations degenerates to
V (xt, 0) = V (s0, 0), (B.23)
V (xt, 1) =
x2t
2
∆t+ e−r∆tEt [V (xt+∆t, ut+∆t)] .
Following the same steps as above the solution for the function V (xt, 1) is
V (xt, 1) = D1x
µ1 − 1
2(σ2 + 2α− (λ+ r + γ1)
x2 (B.24)
−γ1V (a
∗, 0) + (γ1 − λ)c
(r + γ1)
,
in which the root µ1 is defined as
β1 < µ1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
sµ
α
σ2
− 1
2
¶2
+
2(λ+ r + γ1)
σ2
< θ1. (B.25)
To summarise:
10 If xt ∈ [s0, a∗] and the state of the economy is ut = 0, V (xt, 0) is given by
the equation (B.22).
20 If xt < s0 and the state of the economy is ut = 0, V (xt, 0) is constant and
45We have benefited from Scientific Workplace in calculus.
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equals V (s0, 0).
30 If xt ∈ [s0, a∗] and the state of the economy is ut = 1, V (xt, 1) is given by
the equation (B.22).
40 If xt ∈ [s1, s0] and the state of the economy is ut = 1, V (xt, 1) is given by
the equation (B.24).
50 If xt < s1 and the state of the economy is ut = 1, V (xt, 1) is constant and
equals V (s1, 1).
Analytically, we are not able to find the unknown integration constants and band
limits in (B.22) and (B.24). However, using the following smooth-pasting and
value-matching conditions we are able to find the solutions numerically.
Smooth− pasting :



V 0(s0, 0) = 0
V 0(s1, 1) = 0
V 0(a∗, 0) = 0
V 0(a∗, 1) = 0
, (B.26)
V alue−matching :
(
V (s0, 0) = V (a
∗, 0) + c
V (s1, 1) = V (a
∗, 1) + c
.
APPENDIX C
From Appendix B the equations (B.3) and (B.4) result
rV (xt, ut) =
x2t
2
+
·
αxtV
0(xt, ut) +
1
2
σ2x2tV
00(xt, ut)
¸
(C.1)
+λ [(V (a∗, ut) + c)− V (xt, ut)] + γu [(V (xt, ut))− V (xt, ut)] .
Evaluating this equation at point a∗ and trigger bands su, u = 0, 1, gives
rV (a∗, ut) = 0 + 0 + 0 + λ [(V (a
∗, ut) + c)− V (a∗, ut)] (C.2)
+γu [(V (a
∗, ut))− V (a∗, ut)] ,
rV (su, ut) =
s2u
2
+ αsuV
0(su, ut) +
1
2
σ2s2uV
00(su, ut)
+λ [(V (a∗, ut) + c)− V (su, ut)] + γu [(V (su, ut))− V (su, ut)] .
The first three terms in the first equation are zero because at the target level a∗
the state variable is xt = a
∗ − a∗ = 0. Subtracting the first equation from the
second, using second-order Taylor approximation for the term V 00(su, ut) and the
smooth-pasting and value-matching conditions (B.26), and after some rearrange-
ment gives
(au − a∗)2
2
=
>0z}|{
rc +
>0z}|{
λc +γu [c+ V (a
∗, ut)− V (su, ut)] (C.3)
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On the left-hand side we have utilised the information that at the trigger band
point the state variable becomes (xt) |su= au− a∗ denoting the largest deviation
from the target level. The left-hand side is the temptation to adjust, and the
right-hand side is the value of waiting still an instant dt. The first two terms on
the right-hand side are positive. The third term can be rewritten as
>0z}|{
γu
≥0z }| {
[c− (V (su, ut)− V (a∗, ut))]≥ 0. (C.4)
This inequality can be understood as follows: If xt < su, then c ≥ V (xt, ut) −
V (a∗, ut). If xt = su, then c = V (xt, ut) − V (a∗, ut) according to the value-
matching condition.
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APPENDIX D
Table D1
Dummy variables used in estimation
Constant
Province Southern Finland
Western Finland
Eastern Finland
Oulu
Lapland
A˚land
Local Authority City
Commune
Gender of household head Male
Female
Type of household Family without children
One-parent family
Family with children
Aged family
Other families
Educational attainment Basic
Lower middle-level
Higher middle-level
Lowest high-level
Lower candidate-level
Higher candidate-level
Researcher or similar
Unknown
Employee
Socio-economic status Subordinate official
Superior official
Entrepreneur
Agricultural entrepreneur
Student
Retired
Long-term unemployed
Others
Months of unemployed 1-3 months
4-6 months
7-9 months
10-12 months
More than 12 months
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